Introduction
How to maximize the expected revenue of a seller, who sells a single item among a number of buyers, is one of the central problems in microeconomics. The simplest and most widely-used mechanism is the Anonymous Posted-Pricing (AP) mechanism. An anonymous posted-pricing mechanism simply posts a price p for all buyers. The item is sold iff at least one buyer values the item higher than or equal to p. If the seller knows the value distributions of the buyers, he can choose a proper price p to maximize his expected revenue among all AP mechanisms. However, this is not the optimal way to sell a single item. The optimal mechanism is the remarkable Myerson Auction [43] (which will be denoted by OPT in the following discussions). Compared to AP mechanism, Myerson Auction is conceivably more complicated, mainly due to two reasons:
1. It discriminates different buyers with different value priors. This may incur some fairness issues, and is not feasible in some markets.
2. It is an auction rather than a pricing scheme, thus involves more communications between the seller and the buyers. This may also raise some privacy concerns for the buyers, since they need to report their private values, rather than simply making take-it-or-leave-it decisions.
These complications and some other undesirable issues restrict the application of Myerson Auction. To address these issues, two simple mechanisms with intermediate complexity between OPT and AP are well-studied in the literature, and are widely-used in practice: 1. To avoid discrimination, one may use the Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve (AR) [35] ; and 2. To reduce communications between the seller and the buyers, one may use the Sequential Posted-Pricing (SPM) mechanism [16, 17] . We defer the formal definitions of these mechanisms to Section 2.
These four mechanisms form the lattice structure in Figure 1 , both in terms of simplicity, and in terms of revenue but in reversed order. It is well-known in microeconomics that there are revenue gaps between any two of them. But how large can these gaps possibly be?
Quantitative analysis of these gaps is also a striking theme in the theory of algorithmic mechanism design. To measure the gaps among mechanisms, the approximation ratio, which is originated from theoretical computer science, turns out to be a very powerful language. There is rich literature that studies revenue gaps/approximation ratios among different mechanisms [11, 30, 8, 31, 38, 19, 20, 29, 23, 4 , 22].
Our Results
Despite so many previous works on this and other related settings, in the most fundamental environment with asymmetric regular distributions, no tight revenue gaps were previously known for any pair of these four basic mechanisms. In this paper, we establish two tight ratios and one tighter bound, where the last one between OPT and AR disproves a conjecture of near a decade [35] . 
Open Problems and Conjectures
Although we get two tight ratios, there are three ones left open among these four basic mechanisms, namely OPT vs. AP, AR and SPM respectively (in the lattice structure, AR and SPM are incomparable, thus the ratio between them is not that interesting). The main obstacle to getting these tight ratios by current approaches is that we do not have a good method to express OPT in a mathematical program. It is easy to write AP, and in this paper we develop tools to deal with AR and SPM, which enable the proof of our results. By our work, the ratio of OPT to AP is now in a very narrow interval [2.62, e] . We conjecture that the lower-bound of 2.62 is tight, due to the following two reasons. First, in our tight example for SPM vs. AP (see Example 2 in Appendix A.4), OPT does achieve the same revenue as SPM (as Lemma 2 in Section 3 suggests). Second, in all other three settings, namely asymmetric general, i.i.d. general and i.i.d. regular settings, AP has the same revenue gaps w.r.t. OPT and SPM (see Table 1 and Table 2 in Section 6).
By our improved lower-bound, the tight ratio for OPT vs. AR is now in interval [2.15, e] . We believe that neither the lower-bound nor the upper-bound is tight. Moreover, by Chawla et al. [17] and Correa et al. [22] , the ratio of OPT to SPM is in interval [1.34, e/(e−1)]. We slightly believe the lower-bound is tight. For the both problems, tools developed here for AR and SPM may be helpful, and the tight ratios may be achieved by infinite-buyer instances, similar to our tight examples.
Further Related Works
This line of work was initiated by Hartline and Roughgraden [35] , which showed that the revenue gap between OPT and AR is in interval [2, 4] . The most related work of Alaei et al. [4] initiated the mathematical program approach in this context, and gave an improved upper-bound of e for OPT vs. AP. They exploited a technique called Ex-Ante Relaxation, in that it is difficult to directly quantify the revenue from OPT. Ex-ante relaxation is a "fake" mechanism. Nevertheless, it gives an upper-bound for OPT, and is easy to deal with in mathematical programs. The upper-bound of e is the tight ratio between that and AP. Chawla et al. [17] introduced the notion of ex-ante relaxation, which is originated from SPM, and was refined by Alaei [2] later.
Chawla et al. [16, 17] initiated the study for OPT vs. SPM by proving an upper-bound of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 in asymmetric settings (regular or general). Later, Yan [48] showed that the same ratio holds in more general settings. Recently, Correa et al. [22] obtained the tight ratio of 1.34 in i.i.d. settings (regular or general). Hajiaghayi et al. [32] first found the connection between this problem and the notion of prophet inequalities in optimal stopping theory [39, 40] . The last decade has seen extensive progresses on (single and combinatorial) prophet inequalities [6, 37, 45, 46, 1, 27, 26] (see the survey by Lucier [42] and the references therein for more literature), due to their appealing applications in algorithm and mechanism design.
In the multi-item environment, optimal mechanism could be even more complicated. There is a long line of works on proving simple mechanisms constantly approximate the optimal [16, 10, 17, 33, 3, 41, 7, 12, 28, 47, 49, 13, 18, 5, 14, 25, 24] . All these works assume that the distributions of different buyers are independent. To sell a single item among correlated buyers, Myerson Auction may not be optimal. For this, some simple and approximately optimal mechanisms were proposed, such as look-ahead auction and k-look-ahead auction [44, 21] . For a full survey on simple auctions, one can refer to the book entitled "Mechanism Design and Approximation" by Hartline [34] .
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we consider the single-item environment, where there are n buyers with
. Most of our results are established under the standard assumption that all distributions are regular. Moreover, the family of triangular distributions is widely used in our analysis. We introduce these two concepts below.
Regular Distributions and Revenue-Quantile Curves. Given a cumulative density function (CDF) F (p) and its probability density function f (p) (which is assumed to be existing), the virtual value function is defined as ϕ(p)
f (p) , and the revenue-quantile curve is defined as r(q) def = q · F −1 (1 − q). By standard notion, distribution F (p) is regular (i.e. F ∈ Reg) iff its virtual value ϕ(p) is non-decreasing, or equivalently, iff its revenue-quantile curve r(q) is concave. We interchange the definitions whenever one is more convenient for our use.
Triangular Distributions. This family of distributions is first introduced in [4] , named according to the shapes of their revenue-quantile curves (as Figure 2 suggests) . Parameterized by v i ∈ (0, ∞) and q i ∈ (0, 1], a triangular distribution Tri(v i , q i )'s CDF is defined as:
For the triangular distribution Tri(N,
when N goes to infinity. We denote this special triangular distribution by Tri(∞). In this paper, we study the revenue gaps among the following four families of mechanisms.
Anonymous Posted-Pricing (AP). An anonymous posted-pricing mechanism simply posts a price p to all buyers. The item is sold iff at least one buyer values the item no less than p. We use
F i (p) to denote the revenue by posting an anonymous price at p,
)} to denote the optimal revenue among this family of mechanisms. We often drop the term {F i } n i=1 for notational simplicity (the same below for SPM, AR and OPT), when there is no ambiguity from the context. 
) denote the revenue achieved by a specific pair of σ and {p i } n i=1 , and let SPM(σ,
)} be the revenue from the optimal pricing strategy under order σ. Unless otherwise stated, we assume the seller can choose the order σ, and abuse SPM(
Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve (AR). An anonymous reserve mechanism with reserve price p runs in the following way: If there is no buyer who bids above p, the item remains unsold; if there is exactly one buyer biding above p, then sell this item to this buyer with price p; otherwise, the buyer with highest bid gets the item, and pays the second highest bid (which is the remarkable Second-Price Auction). Given distributions
) be the revenue by running anonymous reserve mechanism with reserve price p, and let AR(
). We defer the explicit formula for AR(p, {F i } n i=1 ) to Section 4.
Myerson Auction (OPT). Given distributions {F i } n i=1 , Myerson Auction runs in the following way: Each buyer i is associated with a virtual value function
. Upon receiving bids, the seller sells the item to the buyer with the highest virtual value (required to be above 0), and charges him a critical price p that is the minimum bid for him to win.
Sequential Posted-Pricing vs. Anonymous Posted-Pricing
In this section, we study the revenue gap between SPM and AP, assuming that buyers' values are drawn from regular and independent (not necessarily identical) distributions. This problem is formed in the following program (we safely drop the constraint on p ∈ [0, 1] as it always holds):
subject to:
By solving this program optimally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For asymmetric regular distributions, the supremum of the ratio of SPM to AP is
Proof Overview. Our first step is to show that in the worst case, an instance {F i } n i=1 falls into the family of triangular distributions. Afterwards, we clarify it is safe to assume that there is a buyer with distribution Tri(∞), who contributes a revenue of 1 to SPM. These are formulated in Section 3.1, after which the annoying objective of Program (P1), SPM = max
)}, can be expressed explicitly.
We further prove in Section 3.2 that the revenue from the remaining buyers is upper-bounded by that from infinitely many "small buyers" (in terms of the possibility of buying the item), which is captured by the integration term in the theorem.
We provide a matching lower-bound example in Appendix A.4. The idea is simple: Use finitely many "small buyers" with triangular distributions to approach the instance in the upper-bound proof. With sufficiently many buyers, SPM can be arbitrarily close to the upper-bound.
Upper-Bound Analysis I: Reductions
Exploiting the idea in [4] , we exhibit a method to tailor a regular instance {F i } n i=1 into a triangular one so that SPM remains the same, while AP tends to decrease.
Lemma 1. For any regular instance
We defer the proof of Lemma 1 to Appendix A.1. Transparently, to study the worst case of Program (P1), it suffices to focus on triangular instances. For notational simplicity, we re-index all Tri(v i , q i )'s such that v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n , and keep using F i to denote the CDF of Tri(v i , q i ). Recall the formula for each F i defined in Section 2, we rewrite constraint (1) as
In Appendix A.1, we prove the following structural lemma of SPM and OPT. (1) the optimal sequential posted-price mechanism posts price p i = v i to the i-th buyer, for i from 1 to n; and
Rearranging constraint (2), we rewrite Program (P1) as follows:
We can safely assume that v n ≥ 1. Since constraint (3) is irrelevant to all v i 's that are smaller than or equal to 1, increasing all these v i 's to 1 directly leads to an improved objective value. The next two facts further narrow the space of the worst-case instances:
1. Whenever there are two buyers/distributions with the same v i , we can substitute the buyers with a single (feasible) buyer so that the objective value remains the same.
The worst-case instance contains a buyer with distribution Tri
For notational simplicity, we will not explicitly mention this special buyer later.
These two statements are formalized as Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, and then proved in Appendix A.1. In sum, the optimal objective values of Program (P3) and Program (P1) are equal.
Upper-Bound Analysis II: Optimal Solution
We adapt techniques developed by Alaei et al. [4] to deal with Program (P3). It is easy to check that
p for all p ≥ 1 and x ≥ 0. We apply this inequality to constraint (4), and drop all constraints other than p ∈ {v 1 
where
p 2 , the following lemma (which is proved in Appendix A.2) suggests that these two functions are inherently correlated.
After the aforementioned relaxation, optimum of the new program turns out to be reached when constraint (5) is tight for each k ∈ [n]. This is formalized as the following technical lemma.
Denote v 0 def = ∞ for notational simplicity. Given the tightness of constraint (5), we acquire the recursive formula for each q k that ln 1 +
, where we apply Lemma 3 that R(v 0 ) = 0. After being rearranged, it is equivalent to
Equipped with these formulas, we prove the following mathematical facts in Appendix A.2.
With the p * defined in Lemma 6, we are ready to complete the upper-bound part of Theorem 1. By Lemma 3, e −Q(v 0 ) = 1, and
Together with Lemma 6 that p * ≥ 1, we can conclude that
, that is, a spectrum of "small" (all q i 's tend to 0 + ) triangular distributions lying in interval [p * , ∞). For all p ≥ p * , 1. The total quantity of q i 's cumulating in interval [p, ∞) is given by Q(p);
2.
i:v i ≥p (1 − q i ) approaches to e −Q(p) , in that all q j 's go to 0 + .
As per these, it is easy to see
ensured (by Lemma 5 essentially) to be greater than or equal to SPM({Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 ).
Anonymous Reserve vs. Anonymous Posted-Pricing
In this section, we study the revenue gap between AR and AP. We first obtain the CDF's of the highest and the second highest bids from {F i } n i=1 , which are respectively denoted by D 1 (p) and
For D 2 (p), the event that the second highest bid is no more than p can be partitioned into the following (n + 1) disjoint sub-events: (A 0 ) the highest bid is no more than p; (A i for each i ∈ [n]) bid b i is larger than p, while all other bids are no more than p. Therefore, we have
With these notations, it is easy to see that
. Additionally, the following lemma establishes an explicit formula for AR(p), by using D 1 (p) and D 2 (p).
Lemma 7 ([15]). For any reserve price
This formula was first introduced in [15] , and plays an important role in the proof of our tight ratio of AR to AP. It is also used in the next section to get a better lower-bound between OPT and AR. For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof in Appendix B.1.
Given these formulas for AR and AP, the revenue gap between AR and AP can be characterized by the following program.
We prove the upper-bound in (the most general) asymmetric general setting, which automatically gives an upper-bound to the rest two settings. In Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.3, we respectively construct a matching lower-bound example with i.i.d. general and asymmetric regular distributions, which implies the tightness in all three settings. 
Proof (Upper-Bound Part
. One can easily see from constraint (7) that Φ 1 (p) stochastically dominates D 1 (p), the distribution of the highest bid. That is,
where the inequality follows from the fact that x ≥ ln(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0.
, it is easy to check that d(x) is increasing when x ∈ (0, 1], and that lim
Accordingly, the optimal objective value of Program (P4) is bounded from above by
Putting everything together, the optimal objective value of Program (P4) is no more than
where ( ‡) follows from Taylor series.
Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Reserve
In asymmetric regular setting, the tight ratio of OPT to AR was conjectured to be 2 in [35] . In that paper, a two-buyer instance (Example 1) was proposed, and was conjectured to be the worst case. Nevertheless, here we disprove this conjecture by constructing sharper instances.
Example 1 ([35]
). Suppose there are two buyers: The first buyer's bid is drawn from the so-called "equal-revenue" distribution F (p) = 1 − 1 p , and the second buyer has a deterministic bid of 1. While AR(p) = AP(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [1, ∞), OPT = SPM = 2 (e.g. by sequentially posting price ∞ to the first buyer, and posting price 1 to the second buyer). with ratio of 2.1361, and a four-buyer triangular instance {Tri(v i , q i )} 3 i=0 with ratio of 2.1596. Proof. We first construct the three-buyer instance explicitly. 
Let
,
where the last equality follows from the definition of v 2 . Additionally, we know from Lemma 2 that
. By choosing v 1 ≈ 1.5699, numerical calculation suggests that OPT ≈ 2.1361 and v 2 ≈ 0.8399, as Figure 3 illustrates. Follow the same idea, our four-buyer triangular instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 is given in the above table. Numerical calculation shows that (1) AR(v i ) ≈ 1.0000 for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, so AP ≈ 1.0000;
(1 − q j ) ≈ 2.1596. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Summary of Known Ratios
In this paper, we focus on revenue gaps among OPT, SPM, AR and AP. There is another simple mechanism in the family of sequential posted-pricing that receives lots of attentions, referred as the Order-Oblivious Posted-Pricing (OPM) mechanism in [17] . OPM basically characterizes the best pricing strategy and revenue, when buyers come in worst-case (adversarial) order. It is worth studying, since in some practical cases the seller cannot control the order of buyers. The formal definition of OPM is the following:
In the following two tables, we conclude current state-of-art results of gaps among these mechanisms, for both i.i.d. and asymmetric distributions, and for both regular and general distributions. In these results, an interval basically gives lower-bound and upper-bound, while a number means this bound is tight. Recall the lattice structure in Figure 1, It is always an interesting subject to study gaps among mechanisms. Since some bounds in Table 2 are still not tight, an obvious open question here is to close these gaps, which would give us better understandings of distinctions and relative powers of these mechanisms.
[13] Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design. 
Proof. Let σ * and {p * i } n i=1 respectively be the buyers' coming order and posted prices of the optimal SPM ({F i } n i=1 ). We define {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 to be the instance that v i = p * i and
, which is illustrated in Figure 4(a) . We claim that {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 satisfies properties above.
(a) Revenue-quantile curves
Firstly, by using the same order σ * , and posting the same prices {p * i } n i=1 to the new buyers, the probability of selling to each buyer remains the same and thus, this sequential posted-pricing mechanism extracts the same revenue as SPM ({F i } n i=1 ). For the second property, let p * be the optimal anonymous price for the triangular instance, then
where the first inequality follows from the fact that F i stochastically dominates Tri(v i , q i ) for all i ∈ [n] (illustrated in Figure 4 (b)).
[ Lemma 2] . Given a triangular instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 with v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n , (1) the optimal sequential posted-price mechanism posts price p i = v i to the i-th buyer, for i from 1 to n; and
Proof. For convenience, we only deal with the case that v i < ∞ for all i ∈ [n]. The case that some v i 's equal to ∞ follows by letting those v i 's go from finite numbers to infinity.
Suppose the auctioneer compels the buyers to come for i from 1 to n, and posts price p i = v i to the i-th buyer. In this case, when the i-th buyer comes, 1. The item remains unsold with probability (1 − q j ). By Myerson's seminal work [43] , the expected revenue from OPT equals to the expectation of the highest virtual value, that is,
where F ϕ i (p) be the CDF of the i-th buyer's virtual value. For a triangular distribution Tri(v i , q i ),
for all p ∈ (0, v i ). Accordingly,
.
Define v 0 def = ∞ and v n+1 def = 0 for notational simplicity. It is easy to see
(1 − q j ). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 9. In a worst-case instance, w.l.o.g.
Proof. Suppose v k = v k+1 for some 1 ≤ k < n, we construct a new instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n−1 i=1 as follow:
It suffices to prove that:
For the first claim, according to Lemma 2, SPM {Tri(
where (⋄) follows from the fact that 1
To prove the second claim, we only need to prove that
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 10. In a worst-case instance, there is a buyer with CDF
below with (n − k + 1) buyers,
We claim that
, together with Tri(∞), is feasible to constraint (3);
According to the definition of k, we know 2 ≤ k ≤ n,
We first deal with the feasibility of instance {Tri(
. The case that p ∈ (v 1 , ∞) is trivial, since no one has value above p.
When p ∈ (1, v 1 ], since for those i ≥ 2, the new instances are just equal to previous instance with index (k − 1) greater, we only need to verify
Dropping
where the last inequality follows from the aforementioned facts that
Now constraint (3) turns to be
which follows constraint (4) by rearranging. We continue to prove that
By Lemma 2, the difference between the left and the right hand side is
where the inequality follows from the facts that 1 ≥
(1 − q j ), and that
(1 − q j ). This completes the proof of Lemma 10.
A.2 Missing Proofs in Section 3: Optimal Solution
Proof. Since R = p ln
where ( †) follows that ln(1 + x) ≤ x when x ≥ 0. And since Q(p)
As per these, clearly
For the second limitation,
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
[ Lemma 4] . Given a triangular instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 that constraint (5) is not tight for some k ∈ [n], there exists a triangular instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 such that (1)
for all k ∈ [n]; and (2)
Proof. We construct such {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 by induction. Assume w.l.o.g. k is the smallest index for constraint (5) that is not tight, presented in the following:
We construct a new instance {Tri(v i , q i )} n i=1 in the following way:
For i = k, define v k and q k that satisfy
After such assignment, we claim that 1. Such v k and q k certainly exist, and
For the first claim, define K(x) 
for each k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where the last inequality is strict since 0 < q k < q k . Combining the above two claims together, for each k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can construct desired v i and q i inductively. In summary,
for each i ∈ [n], where both inequalities are strict for each k ≤ i ≤ n. Eventually, the difference between
where the last inequality is strict since q i < q i for each k ≤ i ≤ n. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
[ Lemma 5] . For each i ∈ [n],
dx, we would rearrange this inequality, and turn to prove
We would separate both of the left and the right hand sides into two parts, and deal with inequalities (16,17) instead:
Applying constraint (6) and the fact that
In this form, we can verify inequality (16) by Lemma 11 below. Similarly, applying constraint (6) , and the facts that Q ′ (p) < 0 and Q(v 0 ) = Q(∞) = 0 to inequality (17),
. Taking product over all j ∈ [i] immediately implies inequality (17). This finishes the proof of the lemma.
, we shall prove that
when y > x > 1. According to Lemma 3 that R ′ (y) < 0, we turn to show that
The monotonicity of g(x) completes the proof of Lemma 11.
. It suffices to show that
when y > x > 1. Observe that R ′ (y) < 0, we only need to check that
where the inequality follows from the facts that x > 1, and that R ′ (x) < 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
[
Proof. Due to Lemma 3 that Q ′ (p) < 0, we turn to verify
The first inequality follows immediately from the fact that lim p→1 + Q(p) = ∞. The second one follows from inequality (17), after assigning i = n and taking ln(·) on both hand sides of the inequality.
A.3 Missing Proofs in Section 3: Numeric Calculations
For the formula in Theorem 1, the function involved in the improper integral is integrable. To see this, we need to transform the formula as following:
where ( ‡) follows from integration by substitution (let t = 1 x ∈ [0, 1]). Now, the integrability can be easily inferred from Figure 5(b) . Numerical calculation shows that this number is roughly 2.6202. In this part we propose an ǫ-approximate lower-bound instance, Example 2, based on triangular distributions. The feasibility w.r.t constraint (4) is relatively easy to deal with, and the ǫ-approximation follows by combining Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, and the fact that
Example 2. Given an arbitrarily small ǫ < 1. Choose a sufficiently large n ∈ N + , and define the following triangular instance {Tri(
:
n . The feasibility of this instance w.r.t constraint (4) is straightforward:
in Example 2, with a sufficiently large n ∈ N + ,
Proof. Plugging the formula for each q i into the left hand side, we have
Here we apply a standard argument from Riemann integral.
, with norm δ = b−a n . When n approaches to infinity,
Since ǫ > 0 is fixed prior to n ∈ N + , we can always choose a sufficiently large n ∈ N + such that
In addition,
Applying these inequalities, with the sufficiently large n ∈ N + chosen above,
This concludes our proof of Lemma 13.
Lemma 14. Proof. For all p ∈ [0, ∞), AR(p) can be decomposed into two parts: 1. A revenue of p when there is at least one agent whose bid is above p; 2. Some extra revenue when there are at least two agents whose bids are above p. The first part is obviously p · (1 − D 1 (p)). To calculate the second part, we shall notice that, the probability that the seller gain a revenue of p ′ > p, is exactly the probability that there are two or more buyers whose bids are above p ′ , which equals to (1 − D 2 (p ′ )). Thus, the second part can be formulated as 
. General Setting
We provide a lower-bound example in i.i.d. general setting here, while deferring a more complicated one (with asymmetric regular distributions) to Appendix B.3. Given an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, we find an instance F n feasible to Program (P4), and producing a solution no less than π 2 6 − ǫ . For convenience, we reuse functions Φ 1 (p) and Φ 2 (p) defined in Section 4. For each n ∈ N + , we have F (p) n = Φ 1 (p), which implies the feasibility as p · (1 − Φ 1 (p)) = 1.
And for the ǫ-approximation, when p ∈ (1, ∞) and n approaches to infinity, As per these, and since ǫ is fixed prior to n ∈ N + , we can always choose a sufficiently large n ∈ N + such that
Combining the above two inequalities together, we complete the proof of Lemma 15.
C Missing Proofs in Section 5
[ We calculate the derivative of AR(p),
which concludes the lemma.
